does PHP mysql_real_escape_string() protect database name?

I know that mysql_real_escape_string()

prepends backslashes to the following characters: \x00, \n, \r, \, ', " and \x1a

I know how this protects a query from injection into something like a variable in a where clause. But here's a scenario I am unsure of:

$query = "SELECT * FROM $db WHERE 1";

If $db is taken from a user input, then the user could insert something like:

$db = 'RealDatabase WHERE 1; DELETE FROM RealDatabase WHERE 1; SELECT FROM RealDatabase';

From my understanding, mysql_real_escape_string() would not affect this string, making the final query: $query = "SELECT * FROM RealDatabase WHERE 1; DELETE FROM RealDatabase WHERE 1;开发者_C百科 SELECT FROM RealDatabase WHERE 1";

which would delete the database. Is there another level of protection I am unaware of?

The level of protection you are looking for is supplied by backticks:

"SELECT * FROM `$db` WHERE 1";

Backticks are used to qualify identifiers that could otherwise be ambiguous (ie. MySQL reserved words), and if you are accepting user input or have variably-named columns or databases, you absolutely should use backticks, or I can promise that you will run into trouble in the future. For example, what if you had a system where a temporary field name was created with some user input, only it turned out the field ended up being named update?

"SELECT field1,field2,update FROM table;"

It fails miserably. However:

"SELECT `field`,`field2`,`update` FROM table"

works just fine. (This is actually a real example from a system I worked on a few years ago that had this problem).

This solves your problem in terms of putting in bad SQL. For instance, the following query will simply return an "unknown column" error, where test; DROP TABLE test is the injected attack code:

"SELECT * FROM `test; DROP TABLE test`;"

Be careful though: SQL Injection is still possible with backticks!

For instance, if your $db variable contained data that had a backtick in it, you could still inject some SQL in the normal way. If you're using variable data for database and field names, you should strip it of all backticks before putting it into your statement, and then qualifying it with backticks once inside.

$db = str_replace('`','',$db);
$sql = "SELECT * FROM `$db` WHERE 1";

I utilize a database wrapper which has separate functions for sanitizing data and sanitizing database identifiers, and this is what the latter does :)

You should really look into binding your SQL queries.

This will protect you from basically all SQL injection. It boils down to this:

(taken from PHP.net)

$stmt = mssql_init('NewUserRecord');

// Bind the field names
mssql_bind($stmt, '@username',  'Kalle',  SQLVARCHAR,  false,  false,  60);

// Execute
mssql_execute($stmt);

And PHP has support for binded queries on basically all databases. Oh and of course you should still sanitize all input & output(display).

More info: - http://php.net/manual/en/function.mssql-bind.php

No, mysql_real_escape_string isn't going to help you here. The function is not context-sensitive (it can't be, because it doesn't HAVE any context), and this is a completely different threat model.

You need to go and validate that the table exists, without sending the user-inputted table name directly to the server. The best solution is to use a server-side array/look-up table containing the table names they are allowed to use. If they try to use something that's not in there, then don't let them.

If you really need ALL of the tables, then you can just ask the server "what tables do you have?" and run through it's output (optionally caching it for some period of time to prevent asking the server every time) - but chances are, eventually you'll have a table that you don't want then to poke around in, and then you need to use the array thing anyway, so just go ahead and do that.

Instead of inserting the database name in the get query you can make a separate table of database names and ids. Then append only the id to the query. Then you can look up the corresponding database name for that id and use that. You can then make sure that the id received is numeric (is_numeric) and you can also be certain that the user can only choose from the databases that are in your list.

(Additionally this will prevent users from finding out names of databases and possibly use them elsewhere in an SQL injection on your site.)

Using the first method you parse the database name before using it in your query and make sure it contains no spaces.

Since table names do not accept whitespace characters, just strip them out. That would make the above $DB RealDatabaseWHERE1;DELETEFROMRealDatabase..... Such would invalidate the query, but prevent the flaw.

If you want to prevent this kind of 'hackish' things, just do explode(' ', $db) then get the result array's [0]. That would get the first part (RealDatabase) and nothing else.

Its just best to use it any time that you have questionable data being used. If you are specifying the table yourself and there's no room for tampering, there's no need to escape it. If your users are deciding anything that could potentially get run as a query, escape it.

If you really really must use a get from the user (bad bad bad) for your database then use the following style of coding...

$realname = '';
switch ($_GET['dbname']){
    case 'sometoken' : $realname = 'real_name'; break;
    case 'sometoken1' : $realname = 'real_name1'; break;
    case 'sometoken2' : $realname = 'real_name2'; break;
    case 'sometoken3' : $realname = 'real_name3'; break;
    case 'sometoken4' : $realname = 'real_name4'; break;
    case default : die ('Cheeky!!!');
}

$query = "SELECT * FROM `{$realname}` WHERE 1";

or alternatively ...

$realname = $tablenames[$_GET['dbname']];

if (!$realname)
    die ('Cheeky!!!');

Using these 2 ways or some similar coding will protect your input from unexpected values.

It also means the user never gets to see the real table or database names which they may be able to infer information from.

Make sure you check the content of $_GET['dbname'] to make sure it's valid first otherwise warnings will be issued.

I still say this is a very bad design, it is reminiscent of allowing users to provide a filename and passing that through to I/O functions without a check. It simply too unsafe to consider.

Security is too important to let laziness rule.