Source and importance of nonce / IV for protocol using AES-GCM

I am making a protocol that uses packets (i.e., not a stream) encrypted with AES. I've decided on using GCM (based off CTR) because it provides integrated authentication and is part of the NSA's Suite B. The AES keys are negotiated using ECDH, where the public keys are signed by trusted contacts as a part of a web-of-trust using something like ECDSA. I believe that I need a 128-bit nonce / initialization vector for GCM because even though I'm using a 256 bit key for AES, it's always a 128 bit block cipher (right?) I'll be using a 96 bit IV after reading the BC code.

I'm definitely not implementing my own algorithms (just the protocol -- my crypto provider is BouncyCastle), but I still need to know how to use this nonce without shooting myself in the foot. The AES key used in between two people with the same DH keys will remain constant, so I know that the same nonce should not be used for more than one packet.

Could I simpl开发者_StackOverflow社区y prepend a 96-bit pseudo random number to the packet and have the recipient use this as a nonce? This is peer-to-peer software and packets can be sent by either at any time (e.g., an instant message, file transfer request, etc.) and speed is a big issue so it would be good not to have to use a secure random number source. The nonce doesn't have to be secret at all, right? Or necessarily as random as a "cryptographically secure" PNRG? Wikipedia says that it should be random, or else it is susceptible to a chosen plaintext attack -- but there's a "citation needed" next to both claims and I'm not sure if that's true for block ciphers. Could I actually use a counter that counts the number of packets sent (separate from the counter of the number of 128 bit blocks) with a given AES key, starting at 1? Obviously this would make the nonce predictable. Considering that GCM authenticates as well as encrypts, would this compromise its authentication functionality?

GCM is a block cipher counter mode with authentication. A Counter mode effectively turns a block cipher into a stream cipher, and therefore many of the rules for stream ciphers still apply. Its important to note that the same Key+IV will always produce the same PRNG stream, and reusing this PRNG stream can lead to an attacker obtaining plaintext with a simple XOR. In a protocol the same Key+IV can be used for the life of the session, so long as the mode's counter doesn't wrap (int overflow). For example, a protocol could have two parties and they have a pre-shared secret key, then they could negotiate a new cryptographic Nonce that is used as the IV for each session (Remember nonce means use ONLY ONCE).

If you want to use AES as a block cipher you should look into CMAC Mode or perhaps the OMAC1 variant. With CMAC mode all of the rules for still CBC apply. In this case you would have to make sure that each packet used a unique IV that is also random. However its important to note that reusing an IV doesn't have nearly as dire consequences as reusing PRNG stream.

I'd suggest against making your own security protocol. There are several things you need to consider that even a qualified cryptographer can get it wrong. I'd refer you to the TLS protocol (RFC5246), and the datagram TLS protocol (RFC 4347). Pick a library and use them.

Concerning your question with IV in GCM mode. I'll tell you how DTLS and TLS do it. They use an explicit nonce, i.e. the message sequence number (64-bits) that is included in every packet, with a secret part that is not transmitted (the upper 32 bits) and is derived from the initial key exchange (check RFC 5288 for more information).